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Cultivating Sentimental Dispositions
Through Aristotelian Habituation
JAN STEUTEL AND BEN SPIECKER
The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of
moral education and that habituation is a vital part of
sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard
core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action.
On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics
of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and
why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the
sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral
virtues. Taking Aristotle’s explicit remarks on ethismos as a
starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving
(i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and
consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor.
If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation
seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or
inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating
virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however,
that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into
account, habituation may be an efficacious means of
moderating, reducing or restricting the child’s affective
dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary
to Aristotle’s view, the effectiveness of processes of
habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or
broadening the child’s sentimental dispositions where these
are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third
characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the
virtuous tutor to the child’s behaviour. At the end of the paper,
this predominantly non-cognitive account of the workings of
Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy
Sherman’s primarily cognitive view.
I MORAL EDUCATION IMPLIES SENTIMENTAL EDUCATION
According to the Aristotelian tradition of moral thinking and acting, any
parent or teacher who takes moral education seriously should be engaged
in the practice of cultivating the child’s feelings—his passions,
inclinations, emotions, appetites, pains and pleasures. Special attention
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to the development of the child’s affective life in the context of moral
education is not only typical of Aristotle himself, but also a salient feature
of the educational writings of other representatives of the Aristotelian
tradition, from the classical work of Aquinas to the recent work of
Alasdair MacIntyre. To be sure, the Aristotelian tradition presents moral
education as comprising much more than sentimental education alone. But
the cultivation of affective dispositions is regarded as essential in three
related but different senses—namely, as necessary (the proper aims of
moral education cannot be achieved without sentimental education), as
significant (a considerable part of our moral educational efforts should
be devoted to cultivating the child’s sentiments) and as basic (the settle-
ment of proper sentimental dispositions is a prerequisite for effectively
promoting other mental qualities, particularly those involved in the
intellectual virtue of practical wisdom or critical deliberation). If we may
assume that every evolving tradition of moral reflection and action has
some ‘hard core’ of enduring beliefs and presuppositions, the claim that
moral education essentially involves sentimental education certainly
should be counted as belonging this ‘hard core’, as understood in the
Aristotelian tradition.1
But what exactly are the reasons for considering sentimental education
such an important ingredient of moral education? Especially with regard
to the necessity and significance of sentimental education, those reasons
are basically located in two other claims, which may be taken to be part of
this ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition as well. The first one is that the
virtuous person should be taken as the general or comprehensive aim of
moral education. And because being virtuous implies being a bearer of
many different virtues, these individual traits should be regarded as the
more specific or particular morally educational aims. The second claim is
that moral virtues are not only dispositions for choice and action but also
dispositions towards feelings. It is with respect to how one feels and not
merely to how one chooses and acts that one may be said to be virtuous.
To put it more precisely, a virtuous person is someone who will have and
exhibit particular feelings on the right occasions, for the right reasons,
towards the right people, with the right strength and in the right manner.
Virtuousness implies having proper feelings—that is, having feelings as
one should. It will be obvious that these two claims offer strong reasons
for giving sentimental education a central role in the practice of moral
education. For if the proper aim of moral education is the virtuous person,
and if having proper feelings is partially constitutive of being virtuous,
promoting proper sentimental dispositions will be an important task for
moral educators.
A presupposition of this line of reasoning is that the affective life of the
child is indeed educable. If the child’s dispositions to feel in particular
ways were resistant to all our educational interventions, taking the growth
and settlement of virtuous affective dispositions as an educational aim
would be senseless. It is for this reason that representatives of the
Aristotelian tradition often try to convince us that affective dispositions
are actually susceptible to cultivation. In his Nicomachean Ethics (NE)
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Aristotle divides the human soul into rational and non-rational parts, and
divides the non-rational part itself into the desiring part and the nutritive
part (NE 1102a27–1103a3). Feelings (pathe¯ ) are located in the desiring
part—or, perhaps better, the desiring part is composed of different types of
feelings, such as appetite (epithumia) and emotion (thumos). But although
feelings are located in the non-rational part of the soul, they can obey and
listen to the rational part, not just in the sense that feelings can be kept
under control if they are contrary to the precepts of reason (which is
typical of continence), but also, and more importantly, in the sense that
they can be harmonised with the voice of reason by their being
transformed, moulded or reshaped (which is typical of virtuousness).
Aquinas, in his Summa Theologiae (ST) (Ia2ae, q. 55–67), also maintains
that the passions are susceptible to moderation and redirection in
accordance with the good of reason. The reactions of the sensitive
appetite, which is located in the non-rational part of the soul, are passions,
feelings or emotions. And the moral virtues concerned with the passions,
such as temperance, courage, meekness, chastity, gentleness and
magnanimity, are perfections of the sensitive appetite. In contrast to the
continent or persevering man, who has to suppress or restrain his unruly
passions in order to act well, the sensitive appetite of the morally virtuous
person is brought into full conformity with reason. MacIntyre, too,
believes that the affective life is educable, even to the extent that it would
not be an overstatement to call him an optimist regarding education. For
example, in his Dependent Rational Animals he argues that our having
feelings of affection and sympathy on certain occasions should never be
taken as ‘a brute and unchangeable fact about us’ (MacIntyre, 1999,
p. 115). On the contrary, it is up to us to decide what kinds and degrees
of affection and sympathy we should cultivate in ourselves and encourage
in our children. MacIntyre rightly points out that individuals may find
it difficult to have the proper feelings of affection and sympathy towards
other human beings and nonhuman animals, either because their feelings
are excessive (‘too much’) or because their feelings are deficient (‘too
little’). In his view, however, such deviations from the standards of
appropriate feeling are ‘generally corrigible faults’ (p. 116).
II SENTIMENTAL EDUCATION IMPLIES HABITUATION
One may expect of a tradition of moral thinking and acting that highlights
the role of sentimental education that at least some indication is given of
the ways in which the affective life of the child could be transformed and
steered in the right direction. If the growth and establishment of virtuous
affective dispositions are such important aims of moral education, what
could be the means to achieve these aims?
In the Aristotelian tradition rather different types of educational
interventions are presented as possibly effective, ranging from reading
stories, taking the child to theatrical performances and stimulating mi-
metic enactment of poetry, song and dance, in such a way as to encourage
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the child to emulate virtuous models and to refine the child’s dis-
criminatory capacities. However, a method of cultivating feelings that
is brought to one’s notice time and again, and that is generally presented
as a vital aspect of effective sentimental education, is habituation. The
central place of habituation in cultivating feelings is emphasised not only
by Aristotle but also by other representatives of the Aristotelian tradition.
In his taxonomy of the virtues Aquinas makes the well-known distinction
between the infused and the acquired virtues (SM Ia2ae, q. 55, art. 4). The
former group of moral virtues are caused in us by God without our action,
and therefore cannot be the result of habituation, but any moral virtue that
belongs to the latter group is caused in us by our becoming accustomed to
its practice or acquired by us through our becoming habituated to its acts
(SM Ia2ae, q. 51, art. 2; q. 63, art. 2). MacIntyre, too, stresses the
important role of habituation in the growth and settlement of the moral
virtues, as may be deduced, for instance, from his account of Aristotle’s
views on education into the virtue of justice (MacIntyre, 1988, pp. 113–115),
as well as from his article on the educational views of Aquinas, in which
he discusses sympathetically Aquinas’s claim that ‘the right kind of habi-
tuation . . . is indispensable to the acquisition of the virtues’ (MacIntyre,
1998, p. 100). Indeed, the idea that habituation is a vital aspect of
sentimental education is rightly seen as part of the ‘hard core’ of the
Aristotelian tradition.
But what exactly is habituation if taken as a component of moral
upbringing? What are the defining characteristics of this educational
method? Aristotle’s answer to these questions can be fairly clearly
reconstructed on the basis of his explicit remarks on the nature of
habituation (ethismos) and closely related educational issues. From an
analytical perspective, the outstanding characteristics of Aristotelian
habituation that can be discerned are the following.
First, habituation is essentially a form of learning by doing or, to put it
more precisely, a process of cultivating virtuous affective dispositions by
performing the corresponding virtuous actions. In a much-quoted passage,
Aristotle says that the moral virtues are acquired by first having actually
practised them, just as we acquire crafts or skills: ‘we learn a craft by
producing the same product that we must produce when we have learned
it, becoming builders, e.g., by building and harpists by playing the harp; so
also, then, we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing
temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions’ (NE 1103a32-b2). The
child will not acquire virtuous affective dispositions if our educational
activities are confined to verbal instruction or teaching moral lessons. We
also, and primarily, have to make sure that the child performs the right
actions, that is, does the things the virtuous person would do under the
circumstances.
Second, in the acquisition of the moral virtues it will not be enough to
practise the virtues only a couple of times or to act as virtue requires only
occasionally. Habituation, or at least effective habituation, implies doing
the virtuous things both frequently and consistently. Aristotle does not
specify how frequently virtuous actions need to be performed in order that
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the corresponding virtues should be acquired, but his use of the word
polla¯kis (for example, NE 1103a29, 1105b4), which literally means ‘many
times’, indicates that he assumes that they should be performed over and
over again. Moreover, from other passages in his work it may be deduced
that Aristotle also believes that virtuous actions should be performed
consistently, which roughly means that one acts always (or at least on
most occasions) as virtue requires and, consequently, never (or at least
only exceptionally) in a manner contrary to virtue. Aristotle (NE 1103b7-
22; 1104a10-28) points out that it is not only the moral virtues but also
the moral vices that are produced by performing the correspond-
ing activities. For example, someone who runs away from everything in
fear and never endures anything becomes a coward, and someone who
fears nothing and rushes in to face anything and everything becomes
rash. Accordingly, the most reliable way to acquire the virtue of courage is
always to act as the courageous person would do under the circumstances
and, consequently, never to perform the activities that are expressive of
the vices of cowardice and rashness.
It is important not to confuse frequency of behaviour with consistency
of behaviour. One can imagine that a child has rather limited possibilities
for practising a particular virtue, as, for example, when his parents are
overprotective and give him little scope for practising the virtue of
courage, in the broad sense of that term. Then the child may consistently
act as courage requires but will perform these acts too infrequently to
acquire the dispositions regarding fear, self-confidence and determina-
tion that are characteristic of the courageous person. The educational
upshot is that parents should not only make sure that the child consistently
acts as virtue requires but also give him ample opportunity for doing
virtuous things.
Aristotle’s claim that consistent and frequent virtuous behaviour is
needed for the growth and settlement of the affective dispositions that are
constitutive of the moral virtues sounds like a paradox. For is not being
morally virtuous precisely a precondition for acting virtuously? Aristotle
is well aware of this possible objection to his doctrine. Somebody might
wonder, he writes, what we mean by saying that people need to do
virtuous things in order to become virtuous: ‘For if we do what is
grammatical or musical, we must already be grammarians or musicians. In
the same way, then, if we do what is just or temperate, we must already be
just or temperate’ (NE 1105a19-22).
In order to rebut this objection, it may be helpful to make a distinction
between two dimensions of the paradox in question, which might be called
the motivational and the epistemic dimensions. Focusing on the former
dimension, one may wonder how acting virtuously (justly, temperately,
etc.) can be a precondition for becoming a virtuous (just, temperate, etc.)
person, when having the motivational constitution of the virtuous (just,
temperate, etc.) person is a precondition for acting virtuously (justly,
temperately, etc.). Aristotle himself seems to hold the view that for an
action to be done virtuously the agent must have chosen the action for its
own sake and be stably disposed to choose in that way (NE 1105a32-b1;
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Hutchinson, 1986, pp. 89–92). How, then, could someone who is not yet
virtuous act virtuously? If this is the objection, however, it can be easily
refuted by making a distinction between two senses of acting virtuously
(justly, temperately, etc.). On the one hand, we may use the word
‘virtuous’ in a ‘thicker’ or more substantial way, in such a manner that
calling an action virtuous implies making the assumption that the action
exhibits or springs from the choices and dispositional make-up that are
typical of the virtuous person. If we use the term in this particular sense, it
will be clear that someone who is not yet virtuous cannot act virtuously.
But we can also use the word ‘virtuous’ in a ‘thinner’ or more formal way,
that is, simply to register the fact that the action is the right or the proper
one, or the thing to be done under the circumstances, without making any
reference to the agent’s frame of mind. In this particular sense someone
who is not yet virtuous, and even occasionally the vicious person, may act
virtuously. If we keep the distinction between these two senses in mind,
the motivational dimension of the paradox evaporates: the child becomes
virtuous by acting virtuously, not in the ‘thicker’ or more substantial sense
but only in the ‘thinner’ or more formal sense of that term (cf. Dunne,
1999, p. 58; Sherman, 1989, p. 187).
The objection could, however, also refer to the epistemic dimension of
the paradox, which focuses on the person’s knowledge of or insight into
the moral character of his options. The problem is this. Consistently acting
virtuously, even in the ‘thinner’ or more formal sense of that term,
requires that one has the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, for only
the individual who is practically wise will be able to determine which
options are the virtuous ones under different circumstances. But if
practical wisdom is a precondition of acting virtuously, and if Aristotle is
right in claiming that being practically wise involves having all the moral
virtues, how, then, can the growth and establishment of the virtues
be dependent on consistently acting virtuously? In order to become
practically wise one needs to act as virtue requires, but in order to know or
see what virtue requires one needs to be practically wise. If this is how
the objection should be read, it can be easily rebutted by introducing a
third characteristic of Aristotelian habituation, namely, the supervision of
the learner by one or more virtuous persons, in particular the parents or
other guardians of the child (Sherman, 1989, pp. 160–162). It is true that
the child is not yet able to determine which action should be performed
under the circumstances, or is only able to do this in relatively simple or
familiar situations. Nonetheless he is quite well able to act as virtue
requires, given the coaching or guidance of his tutors, and given, of
course, that his tutors have the wisdom involved in mature moral
virtuousness.
To sum up, then, it can be stated that habituation, in the Aristotelian
sense of the term, consists in (i) practising the virtues or, more pre-
cisely, performing those actions that correspond with virtuous senti-
mental dispositions, (ii) performing such actions frequently and
consistently, and (iii) doing so under the guidance or authority of a
virtuous tutor.
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III DOUBTS ABOUT ARISTOTELIAN HABITUATION:
SKILLS INSTEAD OF SENTIMENTAL DISPOSITIONS
Aristotle clearly believed that, given the natural capacity to acquire the
virtues, proper habituation operates as an effective method of moral
sentimental education. But is this true? Is the educational means
(habituation) really an effective way of achieving the educational aim
(the growth and entrenchment of virtuous affective dispositions)? Because
this question is basically an empirical one, the best way to answer it is by
consulting the results of relevant empirical research. To our knowledge,
however, there has never been any systematic empirical investigation into
the connection between habituation (as the independent variable) and the
development of virtuous sentimental dispositions (as the dependent
variable). But there are other, albeit less reliable ways of examining
whether or not Aristotle’s belief in the effectiveness of habituation is well-
founded. We may, for example, refer to our own experiences with
processes of habituation, or to the evidence other people give us about
their experiences. Moreover, any plausible explanation of the way in
which habituation might do the work it is supposed to do, in particular
by introducing so-called mediating processes that help clarify how or why
the relation between the indicated variables occurs (cf. Eisenberg, 1998,
pp. 17–18), may also be regarded as giving some support for Aristotle’s view.
At first blush habituation does not seem to be a suitable method for
cultivating feelings. The educational means, habituation, and the educa-
tional aim, the growth and settlement of virtuous affective dispositions,
seem to be ill-matched.
To begin with, the first characteristic of habituation, the fact that
habituation is essentially a form of learning by doing seems to be
indicative of learning skills rather than of acquiring affective dispositions.
Skills, or at any rate paradigmatic examples of skills, cannot be acquired
without practice, without repeatedly doing the things in question, whereas
affective dispositions, if learned at all, can be acquired in quite different
ways, for instance by classical conditioning or purely by affective
contagion. Thus, it is hardly conceivable that one can become a skilled
water-colourist without having practised painting in water colours, but a
single experience with a snapping dog may lead to ineradicable feelings of
distrust regarding this animal’s nature.
This comparison only shows, however, that affective dispositions,
unlike skills, need not be the result of learning by doing. What it does not
show is that learning by doing cannot result in affective dispositions, or
that learning by practice cannot be an effective way of acquiring them.
This, of course, is true, but the problem still remains that, while the
relationship between practice and the learning of skills seems intelligible
enough and even natural, the idea of a similar relationship between
practice and the establishment of affective dispositions is rather obscure
and hard to accept without some convincing explanation. Suppose, for
example, that we want our students to acquire the intellectual virtue of
clarity of thought and expression, and that we try to achieve this aim by
Sentimental Dispositions Through Aristotelian Habituation 537
r The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 2004.
systematically encouraging them to expound their views as clearly as
possible, to construct their arguments in a well-organised way, to avoid
obscure language, to give lucid definitions of terms that may give rise to
misunderstandings and to perform many other relevant activities that are
expressive of this virtue. Doing such things, and doing them repeatedly, is,
without doubt, the most effective way of acquiring the skills of clear
thinking and writing. But why should the very same practice itself also be
an effective way of producing the sentimental dispositions that are
constitutive of the virtue of clarity, dispositions such as a heart-felt
aversion towards woolly language and an enjoyment of the lucidity of
neatly arranged and well-presented arguments? It is evident that all those
exercises in clear thinking and writing might just as well not have any
influence on the student’s feelings whatsoever or even lead to
unfavourable affective attitudes towards clarity. The same seems to be
true of the typically moral virtues. Helping people in all kinds of different
circumstances in the context of service-learning2 is most likely to
make students more skilled in solving complex helping problems and in
offering effective assistance. But why should helping behaviour as such
necessarily lead to the growth and settlement of the affective dispositions
involved in the virtue of helpfulness, such as concern, sympathy and
feelings of responsibility? Perhaps the impact of service-learning projects
will be that students develop an aversion to the standard forms of
community support.
It is interesting to note that even Gilbert Ryle, in his pioneering paper
‘Can virtue be taught?’ (1972), associates habituation, as explained by
Aristotle, with acquiring skills rather than with cultivating feelings. After
having shown that the acquisition of skills comes, if at all, only with
practice, Ryle raises the question of whether the virtues may be the result
of similar learning processes. At first he is inclined to answer this question
in the affirmative (pp. 436–437), but the striking thing is that in this
context he merely refers to virtuous activities that may be performed more
or less skilfully, especially to forms of self-control, such as curbing one’s
greediness and keeping one’s temper. As we have argued elsewhere
(Steutel, 1999, pp. 126–131), certain virtues, especially the virtues of will-
power, are partly composed of capacities of self-control, and having such
capacities roughly consists in being skilled in using appropriate techniques
of self-intervention. Immediately after defending the view that virtues may
be the result of learning by doing, however, Ryle begins to attack it by
pointing out that skills and virtues are different in important respects. He
shows that being virtuous, unlike being skilled, implies having particular
wants and aversions, attitudes and feelings, cares and preferences—in
short, the things we call virtuous sentimental dispositions. And because of
this, he maintains, virtues cannot just be the result of repeated practical
exercises. In other words, so long as Ryle focuses on the skills that are part
of the virtues of will-power, this tends to support Aristotle’s claim that
virtues are learned by practice; but for Ryle this claim seems completely
to lose its plausibility as soon as he recognises that moral virtues, unlike
skills, are constituted by affective dispositions.
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IV DOUBTS ABOUT ARISTOTELIAN HABITUATION:
HABITS INSTEAD OF SENTIMENTAL DISPOSITIONS
If we focus on the second characteristic of habituation, the condition of
frequency and consistency, habituation seems to be a proper method for
establishing habits, rather than a suitable method of cultivating affective
dispositions. To explain why this is the case, a brief exposition of the
defining characteristics of habits may be helpful.
If we elaborate on the analyses of John Passmore (1980, pp. 120–126) and
R. S. Peters (1981, pp. 55–56, 97–98), a first characteristic that should be
pointed out is that habits are dispositions to perform particular actions or
activities, such as getting up early, going to the pub after office hours or
reading a story to the children at bedtime. Perhaps linking habits with
intentional behaviour makes the definition too narrow, as some habits seem
to be dispositions towards mental acts (for example, thinking of objections
to our moral claims) or towards non-intentional behaviour (for example,
nail-biting). But in any case habits are dispositions to do certain kinds of
things, and not, for example, dispositions to be affected in certain ways
under particular circumstances. Second, habits are relatively settled or
permanent dispositions to do certain kinds of things. For example, when
we say that checking our email before going to bed is one of our habits, the
clear implication is that this is something that we have been doing for quite
some time now and, most probably, that it is something we shall continue to
do. Habits do, of course, change, but to call some rather unstable or
temporary feature of someone’s behaviour a habit would be a misapplication
of the term. Third, habits are dispositions towards actions or activities that
are performed regularly. For example, having the habit of looking at an
evening news programme implies doing this not incidentally but on a regular
basis. This does not mean that a habit cannot be a disposition towards
actions or activities that are performed only rarely or infrequently. One may
have a habit of eating turkey only on Thanksgiving Day or a habit of
going to church only on Christmas Eve. The point is that having a
habit implies always or at least usually doing certain things when the
moment has come or the circumstances occur—not necessarily that the
moment comes often or the circumstances occur frequently, although this
may be the case with respect to most of our habits. Fourth, habits are
dispositions to do certain things automatically, without reflection, delibera-
tion, planning or choice. This does not mean, as Peters suggests, that having
a habit implies being able to perform the corresponding actions or activities
while thinking about quite different matters or while concentrating on
something else (Peters, 1981, p. 55). A person may have the habit of study-
ing at the university library, or the habit of playing chess on Monday even-
ing, or the habit of giving reasons for taking a particular ethical standpoint,
and obviously such activities often require much reflection and great
concentration. But what the person does not need to do is deliberately decide
on each separate occasion to perform these activities. On the contrary, if the
activities are expressive of habits, the person will normally perform them
without first pondering on their value or weighing up the pros and cons.
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It is particularly the third characteristic, the fact that habits are
dispositions to do certain things on a regular basis, that makes a
connection with processes of habituation almost self-evident. Not all
habits are the result of habituation, and a habit, unlike habituation, is not
necessarily related to frequent behaviour. But the kind of regularity that is
typical of having a habit implies the kind of consistency that is
characteristic of habituation. It is this similarity that seems to make the
process of habituation particularly apt for cultivating habits. Many parents
want their children to acquire the habit of washing their hands before
dinner. And what would be a more natural way to achieve their aim than
consistently inciting or urging them to wash their hands before sitting
down at the table? By consistently doing the proper things at the proper
moment, the odds are that the child will acquire a settled disposition to do
those things at the right time.
Of course, the fact that doing the proper things regularly, and therefore
consistently, seems to be an effective way of acquiring habits does not
exclude the possibility that the same method may also effectively
stimulate the growth and settlement of affective dispositions. But just like
the relation between practice and learning skills, the relation between
consistently doing the proper things and the establishment of correspond-
ing habits is quite easy to grasp, whereas a relationship between such a
way of learning and acquiring sentimental dispositions is difficult to
fathom. Doing virtuous things on a regular basis is likely to result in
virtuous habits, but how could such a practice also result in dispositions to
be affected in virtuous ways? Suppose, for example, that cultivating the
virtue of charity is part of our educational programme. With reference to
Aristotle’s view on habituation, we consistently incite the child to perform
particular acts of charity, like putting aside a small part of his pocket
money for a good cause, doing some shopping for invalid neighbours and
standing up for senior citizens on the bus. It is easy to understand how
always doing such things when the moment has come will make these
activities habitual. But it is hard to grasp how performing charitable acts
on a regular basis will itself also result in the firmly settled affective
dispositions that are constitutive of the virtue of charity, such as the
disposition to feel compassion, pity, distress or relief under the proper
circumstances.
We might be criticised for overlooking the fact that the term ‘habit’ also
stands for a broad range of mental qualities, including dispositions to have
particular feelings or to feel particular emotions under certain conditions.
Authoritative English dictionaries tell us that the term ‘habit’, in its most
current sense, refers to a settled disposition or tendency to act in a certain
way (The Oxford English Dictionary) or to something that one does often
or regularly (Collins Cobuild ). This prevalent use of ‘habit’ is the one we
explained above. But we seem to have failed to notice that the term is also
used in the sense of ‘habit of mind’ (Spiecker, 1999, p. 214). In this
instance, the term does not stand for a pattern of action, but refers to the
way in which a person is mentally or morally constituted, to the sum of the
individual’s mental and moral qualities (The Oxford English Dictionary),
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or to a particular mental constitution or the kind of thought, feeling or
attitude someone generally has (Collins Cobuild). Moreover, sometimes,
especially in authoritative translations of Aquinas’s writings, the term
‘habit’ refers to a class of states or dispositions that includes the virtues
and vices. In his classical definition of virtue Aristotle uses the term hexis
to denote the genus proximum of the virtues (NE 1106b36-1107a3;
1105b19-1106a14). As the Latin equivalent of hexis, Aquinas uses
the term habitus, and this term is normally translated into English with
the term ‘habit’. So this use of the term, just like the use of ‘habit’ in the
sense of ‘habit of mind’, also covers the sentimental dispositions that
are constitutive of the moral virtues.
This objection, however, is beside the point. We do not want to deny
that sentimental dispositions are habits in the technical sense of hexeis
or habitus, nor that the term ‘habit’ does have the indicated different
senses in ordinary language. The only point we are making is that the
relationship between regularly behaving well and acquiring habits in the
former sense (habits of behaviour) is readily intelligible, while a similar
relationship between doing the proper things on a regular basis and
acquiring habits in the latter sense (habits of affection) is difficult
to comprehend.
At the end of the previous section we noted that Ryle tends to identify
habituation, as explained by Aristotle, with the training of skills rather
than with the cultivation of sentimental dispositions. Here it may be
instructive to point out that Peters interprets Aristotelian habitua-
tion neither as a method of cultivating feelings nor as a form of training
in skills, but rather as a way of inculcating habits. In his theory of
moral education Peters makes a distinction between different types of
virtue, including highly specific virtues, such as punctuality, thrift and
politeness, and motivational virtues, such as compassion, gratitude and
concern for others (Peters, 1981, pp. 93–95). In discussing whether or
not virtues may be regarded as habits, he argues that the highly specific
virtues seem to be the most obvious candidates, in particular because these
virtues are connected with specific types of acts that can be performed
automatically. In his view, however, it would be wrong to regard the
motivational virtues as habits, since exercising them essentially involves
the arousal of feelings and the active employment of one’s mind (p. 98).
Whatever one may think of this distinction, it is striking that Peters
interprets Aristotle’s remarks on habituation as a pointed description of
the way in which habits are acquired, and therefore also of the growth and
establishment of the highly specific virtues (p. 96). Because Aristotle
stresses the importance of habituation for cultivating virtuous affective
dispositions, making a connection between habituation and the develop-
ment of the motivational virtues would have been in line with Aristotle’s
views. But in fact Peters only sees an educational link between habituation
and the highly specific virtues because he considers Aristotelian
habituation essentially to be a process of acquiring habits, in the sense
we explained above. And is not this a quite natural interpretation of
Aristotelian habituation?
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VI HOW ARISTOTELIAN HABITUATION MIGHT WORK:
GEWOONTEVORMING AND GEWENNING
Up to this point the results of our exploration of Aristotelian habituation
are rather disappointing. If we focus on the first two characteristics of
habituation, it seems to be a form of training in skills or inculcating habits,
rather than a form of cultivating sentimental dispositions. However, one of
the reasons why we were unable to reveal a positive relationship between
habituation and the cultivation of the sentiments might be that we paid
attention only to the growth or settlement of affective dispositions. We
have not introduced any example in which habituation is intended to
mitigate or even to remove affective dispositions, instead of strengthening
or inculcating them. Aristotle holds the view that our feelings and
emotions may deviate from the mean either because they are deficient
(‘too little’) or because they are excessive (‘too much’). Thus far we have
focused almost exclusively on aspects of people’s inner lives that may be
considered somehow deficient. But it may well be that habituation is
particularly pertinent to the fashioning of an emotional life that is in some
way excessive.
At this point it may be interesting to note that both the Greek
term ‘ethismos’ and the English term ‘habituation’ can be translated into
Dutch with two different terms that have slightly different meanings—
namely, ‘gewoontevorming’ and ‘gewenning’. Literally translated, the
term ‘gewoontevorming’ means ‘the formation of habits’, and it is this
term that is used as the Dutch equivalent of ‘ethismos’ in a recent, well-
received Dutch translation of the Ethica Nicomachea (Aristotle, 1999).
The term ‘gewenning’, however, roughly means the same as ‘being
accustomed to’ or ‘becoming or being made used to’.3 This is the meaning
that Peters seems to have in mind when he defines ‘habituation’ as ‘a wide
class of learning processes in which people learn by familiarising
themselves with, or getting used to, things, and by repetition’ (Peters,
1981, p. 102). Now the important thing is that the term ‘gewenning’,
unlike the term ‘gewoontevorming’, usually refers to learning processes in
which our feelings are tempered, mitigated, or in some way reduced. As
an illustration of his own definition of ‘habituation’, Peters gives the
example of a boy who ‘might learn not to be afraid of dogs . . . by being
constantly in their presence and getting used to their ways’ (pp. 102–103).
This is a clear case of gewenning: excessive feelings of anxiety may
gradually lose their strength and even disappear by means of repeated
confrontation with their object.
So by shifting our attention from compensating for sentimental deficit to
tempering sentimental excess, we seem to have found forms of habituation
that may be reasonably effective. Although gewenning normally implies
learning processes in which particular feelings are tempered or even fade
away, it is not necessarily a way of making our inner life more virtuous. In
many cases getting used to things involves some kind of blunting, which
often means that the strength or scope of valuable feelings becomes
deficient. For that reason, Peters denies that habituation, in the sense of
542 J. Steutel and B. Spiecker
r The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 2004.
gewenning, is a proper method of cultivating motivational virtues, such as
a concern for others. Habituation, he says, seems to be the wrong sort
of term for stimulating children to be sensitive to the plight of others,
‘for the last thing we want is to habituate children to the sight of suffering’
(p. 107). But cases of gewenning could also be pointed out that clearly
work in the right direction. For example, by getting used to regulating
immoderate sense-desires or inhibiting inordinate appetites, the frequency,
intensity or persistence of such desires and appetites may become less
excessive or more appropriate, which may be seen as an important step in
acquiring the virtue of temperance. Or by getting used to dangerous
situations or threatening circumstances, we may become less frightened
and therefore more courageous.
To sum up, then, some forms of habituation, in particular forms that are
called ‘gewenning’, do not merely consist in training skills or acquiring
habits of behaviour, but are genuine ways of modifying our affective life
as well. From a moral educational viewpoint, however, the importance of
gewenning should not be overestimated. The centre piece of moral
sentimental education seems to be much more a matter of strengthening or
inculcating proper affective dispositions than a matter of mitigating or
getting rid of improper ones. According to Philippa Foot (1978, pp. 8–10),
the virtues are to be understood as corrective, in the sense either of
moderating excessive temptation or of compensating for deficiency of
motivation. Virtues such as persistence, industriousness, diligence,
patience and temperance, which may loosely be called the virtues of
will-power, seem to belong to the former group, as they can be understood
as corresponding to natural feelings and inclinations that have to be kept in
check (Steutel, 1999, pp. 126–127). Consequently, insofar as promoting
the virtues of will-power implies sentimental education, it will largely be a
matter of gewenning. For example, cultivating the proper sentimental
dispositions that are constitutive of the virtue of patience will be a matter
of moderating the child’s liability to respond with excessive feelings of
impetuosity, irritation and boredom by accustoming him to situations in
which patient behaviour is required. This developmental relationship with
gewenning may be the reason why Aristotle illustrates his view on
habituation by merely giving examples of virtues of will-power, especially
temperance and courage (NE 1104a20-b4).
The corrective function of cardinal moral virtues such as justice and
benevolence, however, seems to be quite different. Unlike the virtues of
will-power, these do not correspond to particular natural inclinations that
have to be kept in check, but rather to deficiencies of motivation that have
to be made good, deficiencies such as a limited concern for other people’s
needs or a lack of respect for the rights of one’s fellow citizens.
Accordingly, a central part of moral sentimental education will consist in
strengthening or promoting the growth of virtuous affective dispositions,
in particular the concerns, cares and commitments that are constitutive
of benevolence and justice. And we still have not found an answer to
the question as to how habituation could be a way of establishing, inten-
sifying, deepening or broadening such virtuous sentimental dispositions.
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According to L. A. Kosman, acting in ways that are naturally asso-
ciated with a certain range of feelings ‘will ‘‘bring about’’ those very
feelings, and eventually . . . one develops states of character that dispose
one to have the right feelings at the right time’ (Kosman, 1980, p. 112).
Although we do not deny that this observation may be true, we have not
yet found any convincing example or plausible explanation of such a
‘positive’ relationship between acting and affective dispositions.
VII HOW ARISTOTELIAN HABITUATION MIGHT WORK:
THE ROLE OF THE TUTOR
But what about the third defining feature of habituation, the fact that habi-
tuation is impossible without the supervision of a virtuous tutor, usually a
parent or a teacher? Does this characteristic point us towards what we
need for a plausible interpretation of the relationship between habituation
and the growth and settlement of virtuous sentimental dispositions?
From our brief description of the authoritative role of the tutor in the
second section, one might easily get the impression that the tutor’s only
task is to tell the child what to do under the circumstances. The child
should act as virtue requires, but because he is not yet able to determine
which action is the right or the virtuous one under the circumstances in
question, he should follow the instructions of someone who is practically
wise. To be sure, this is an important element of habituation. But to reduce
the role of the tutor to the giving of instructions would be to caricature
Aristotle’s views.
To begin with, at many places in his work Aristotle maintains that virtue
and vice have to do with pleasure and pain. Virtues include dispositions to
like or to enjoy the things that are just or noble, and to dislike or to be
pained by the things that are unjust or bad. Such affective dispositions,
says Aristotle, are the result of upbringing: ‘we need to have had the
appropriate upbringing—right from early youth, as Plato says—to make
us find enjoyment or pain in the right things’ (NE 1104b11-13). And
he depicts the kind of upbringing he is referring to as a form of habituation
by means of pleasure and pain. To put it differently, the virtuous
dispositions towards pleasure and pain are cultivated by the application of
pleasure and pain (NE 1104b16-18; 1172a21-22). Accordingly, the task of
the tutor does not merely consist in giving the child instructions. If the
tutor wants to bring up the child properly, the tutor must reward or praise
the child when he is acting as virtue requires and punish or blame the child
when he is acting contrary to virtue. In modern jargon we might say that
habituation is a form of conditioning in which virtuous affective
dispositions are inculcated by connecting the child’s behaviour with
different reinforcing and punishing stimuli (Kupperman, 1999, p. 205;
Pela´ez-Nogueras and Gewirtz, 1995, pp. 182–183).
The role of pleasure and pain in Aristotelian habituation can be
elaborated by spelling out the implications of Aristotle’s thesis that the
tutor must be a virtuous person. As indicated before, one of the reasons
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why the tutor must be virtuous is that practical wisdom is required for
giving the child the proper instructions. But being a virtuous person not
only implies having the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom: it also
implies having essentially moral virtues, and these virtues might best be
construed in terms of particular cares or concerns (Carr, 1991, pp. 200–
208; Jackson, 1978, pp. 235–236; Ryle, 1972, pp. 440–441). For example,
a person of benevolence has a concern for the well-being of others or cares
about their happiness; and a person of justice has a concern for justice or
an attachment to ideals in respect of how people should be treated. Such
virtuous cares and concerns are not merely dispositions to act in certain
ways, or dispositions that generate action tendencies under certain
conditions, but also dispositions to have and exhibit particular feelings
or to feel and exhibit particular emotions, such as compassion, sympathy,
respect, indignation, distress, relief, admiration and gratitude. A virtuous
concern is not itself a feeling or emotion but a disposition that is
manifested in having and exhibiting feelings or feeling and exhibiting
emotions. To put it more technically, it is a disposition that can be
explained by subjunctive conditionals that relate the disposition to
observable phenomena, including different kinds of affective response
(Brandt, 1970, pp. 29–30).
Given the fact that the tutor is a person with virtuous cares and
concerns, we can sketch a more sophisticated picture of the role of
pleasure and pain in habituating the child. As a reaction to the child’s
behaviour, the tutor will not merely give the child a reward when he is
acting rightly, or confront him with unpleasant things when he is acting
wrongly, but also show in word or deed all kinds of feelings and emotions.
If the child is acting as virtue requires, the tutor will respond with positive
feelings and emotions, showing joy, delight, elation, relief or pride, and if
the child is acting contrary to virtue, the tutor will exhibit negative
feelings and emotions, such as distress, sorrow, anger, sadness or dis-
appointment. These positive and negative sentimental responses to the
child’s behaviour, which are all manifestations of virtuous concerns, will
also function as reinforcing or punishing stimuli. In particular if there is a
mutual loving relationship between the child and his tutor, which will
normally be the case if the tutor is his parent, the child will experience the
tutor’s positive affective responses as pleasurable and the negative
affective responses as painful.
Moreover, and in more general terms, the tutor will function as a model
(Carr and Steutel, 1999, p. 253; Pela´ez-Nogueras and Gewirtz, 1995,
pp. 183–185). The tutor’s virtuous cares and concerns will be manifested
in virtuous deeds and appropriate affective responses, and given a good
relationship of love and trust between the tutor and the child, the child will
be inclined to imitate those actions and responses (cf. NE 1180b3-8). Part
of this process of imitation will be some kind of self-reinforcement or self-
punishment. Because the child sees the tutor as a model or as representing
an ideal, his affective responses to his own behaviour will resemble those
of his tutor. If he recognises that his behaviour is contrary to the ideal set
by his tutor, he will feel ashamed or be angry with himself, and when he
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succeeds in approximating the ideal, he will feel pleased or respond with
feelings of pride, which may stimulate further moral growth.
We believe that the learning processes indicated here do plausibly show
how and why habituation may be an effective way of stimulating the
development and settlement of virtuous sentimental dispositions. On the
basis of the first two characteristics of Aristotelian habituation—acting as
virtue requires and doing so frequently and consistently—our attempt
to reveal the workings of habituation has been only partially success-
ful. Although the form of habituation that we called gewenning might be
presented as possibly effective, it is only a ‘negative’ method of
sentimental education in the sense that it is merely directed at moderating
or limiting the scope of the child’s affective dispositions where these are
somehow excessive. However, on the basis of the third defining feature of
Aristotelian habituation—the authoritative role of the virtuous tutor—a
plausible account can also be given of ‘positive’ methods of sentimental
education that may be effective. Given the presence of a virtuous tutor,
forms of pervasive identification and imitation, backed up by different
forms of conditioning, are likely to result in building up, strengthening
or broadening the scope of cares and concerns where these are in some
way deficient.
VII SOME FINAL REMARKS
When one investigates Aristotelian habituation, a careful distinction
should be made between explicating its defining features (What are the
central characteristics of Aristotelian habituation?) and explaining how or
why it works (Is Aristotelian habituation an effective way of cultivating
sentimental dispositions?). Regarding the latter aspect we must, of course,
make the further distinction between Aristotle’s explanation of the
workings of habituation and our own account of how or why Aristotelian
habituation may be effective. As may be deduced from our inquiry so far,
our own view differs from Aristotle’s account in at least one important
respect. According to Aristotle, doing the virtuous things frequently and
consistently is in itself an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental
dispositions. We have argued, however, that although such practices
may result in more moderate or less excessive feelings and desires
(gewenning), it is hard to conceive how acting as virtue requires on a
regular and consistent basis could in itself be an effective way of boosting
the growth of affective dispositions where these are somehow deficient.
For that reason, we have stressed the importance of the role of the tutor,
probably much more than Aristotle would be inclined to do.
The most obvious and direct way of reconstructing Aristotle’s account
of how habituation might do the work it is supposed to do is to consult his
own explicit remarks about this matter. This is grosso modo the strategy
we have followed in our investigation. Both our analytic mapping of the
defining features of Aristotelian habituation and our interpretation of his
explanation of how such a practice might be effective are based largely on
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Aristotle’s own explicit account, especially on the things he says about
cultivating the moral virtues in Book II.1-3 of his Nicomachean Ethics.
Another, more indirect way of reconstructing Aristotle’s views regarding
the effectiveness of habituation is to spell out the implications of his texts
that are clearly not intended to address the subject of habituation but
pertain to other issues. A major example of this approach is Nancy
Sherman’s analysis of habituation in the final chapter of her book, The
Fabric of Character (1989). Under traditional interpretations of
Aristotle’s explicit remarks, she argues, habituation is seen primarily as
a non-cognitive or mechanical training of desires towards appropriate
objects (pp. 157–158, 162). This interpretation, however, does not do
justice to Aristotle’s conception, for if we bring to bear ‘a broader range of
texts’ (p. 158), or if we extrapolate from other parts of his work ‘in a way
that is consistent with its spirit’ (p. 171), we can see that it would be much
more in line with Aristotle’s views to construe habituation as a critical
practice in which various cognitive capacities are cultivated. It is
especially on the basis of Aristotle’s account of the emotions in his
Rhetoric, according to which emotions should be seen as essentially
involving specific beliefs, evaluations or judgements, that Sherman tries to
show that an indispensable part of Aristotelian habituation consists in
cultivating the child’s perceptual and discriminatory abilities, particularly
by correcting and refining his reading or interpretation of the particular
circumstances (pp. 166–173).
We do not want to deny that emotional responses are dependent on the
way in which the situation is construed and, consequently, that instructing
the child in how to perceive or discern the circumstances that warrant
these responses is an important aspect of cultivating his affective life
(Spiecker, 1999, pp. 216–217). Indeed, exhorting the child to perform
certain actions in the context of gewenning, as well as responding to the
child’s behaviour with reinforcing or punishing stimuli, should go hand in
hand with giving the child some explanation, not only to confirm or
criticise his interpretation of the situation and his corresponding emotional
reactions but also to promote the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom by
initiating the child into habitual practices of giving and accepting reasons
(Curren, 2000, pp. 211–212). Neither do we want to deny that interpreting
habituation in terms of such a critical practice may be in line with
Aristotle’s texts that deal with other issues. What is striking, however, is
that Sherman considers the cultivation of discriminatory abilities to be
central to Aristotelian habituation (1989, p. 172) and, consequently, tends
to marginalise the formative role of the characteristics of habituation
highlighted by Aristotle himself. To be sure, she recognises that,
according to Aristotle, habituation ‘involves essentially practice and
repetition’ (p. 177), and she also admits that the use of rewards and the
threat of punishment will have a place in habituating the child (pp. 164,
171, 190). But she nowhere acknowledges that these characteristics of
Aristotelian habituation may play an important role in cultivating
sentimental dispositions—for example, by pointing out the mitigating
effects of gewenning, or by recognising that having the right feelings
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at the right time not only is dependent on having well-developed
discriminatory abilities, but also requires the settlement of virtuous cares
and concerns by means of forms of conditioning and modelling. And, what
is more important, by rejecting the mechanical interpretation of
Aristotelian habituation, she tends to downplay the extent to which
Aristotle sees habituation as essentially involving the establishment of
virtuous sentimental dispositions through acting frequently and consis-
tently as the virtuous person would do under the circumstances.
Nonetheless, this is exactly what Aristotle explicitly claims, not only
once, but frequently and consistently!
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NOTES
1. How exactly traditions of moral enquiry and practice are (or should be) differentiated, and also
on what basis someone is (or could be) considered a representative of a moral tradition, are
complicated questions (cf. Vokey, 2001, pp. 66–73). Here we simply assume that every moral
tradition has its own distinctive core of shared beliefs and that those who embrace and defend
these beliefs are its representatives.
2. Service-learning, which is rather popular in the United States, may be defined as the active
participation of students in thoughtfully organised service that is conducted in and meets the needs
of communities. Examples of service-learning projects vary from testing the local water quality to
preparing food for the homeless.
3. Two of the definitions of the term ‘habit’ that are given in The Oxford English Dictionary—
namely, ‘A settled disposition or tendency to act in a certain way’ and ‘The condition of being
accustomed to something through having constantly to do with it’—can be regarded as
descriptions of the successful result of gewoontevorming and gewenning respectively.
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